

15th International Summer School "Democracy and Security Revisited - Transformations in Egypt and Tunisia and EU Re-(Dis-)Orientation", Berlin, July 10-22, 2011

Fakoussa-Behrens, Dina (Ed.); Achrainer, Christian (Ed.)

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerk / collection

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Fakoussa-Behrens, D., & Achrainer, C. (Eds.). (2012). *15th International Summer School "Democracy and Security Revisited - Transformations in Egypt and Tunisia and EU Re-(Dis-)Orientation", Berlin, July 10-22, 2011* (DGAP-Bericht, 21). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.; EU-Middle East Forum - EUMEF-. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56262-8>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

DGAPbericht

Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

N° 21

Dezember 2012

Dina Fakoussa-Behrens and Christian Achraimer (eds.)

15th International Summer School 2011

“Democracy and Security Revisited – Transformations in
Egypt and Tunisia and EU Re- (Dis-) Orientation”

Berlin, July 10–22, 2011
EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)
German Council on Foreign Relations
Berlin 2012



DGAP

Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

Dina Fakoussa-Behrens and Christian AchRAINER (eds.)

15th International Summer School “Democracy and Security Revisited – Transformations in Egypt and Tunisia and EU Re- (Dis-) Orientation”

Berlin, July 10–22, 2011

EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)

German Council on Foreign Relations

Berlin 2012

Contents

3	Acknowledgements
4	Foreword
6	German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
7	EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)
10	Agenda
19	List of Participants
20	Lectures at DGAP
53	Social Activities and Visits to German Institutions
58	Working Groups and Debates

Acknowledgements

The EU-Middle East Forum would like to thank its supporters, partners, sponsors and friends for making the 15th DGAP International Summer School such a great success. We are especially grateful to the following institutions for their support:

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**



BMW Stiftung

Herbert Quandt

We would also like to thank the Office for the Federal Commissioner for preserving the record of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU), the German Federal Ministry of Defence, Infratest dimap, the German Bundestag, and taz.die tageszeitung for their kind invitations.

We extend our strong gratitude to our assistant Anja Runge and to our intern and rapporteur Maria Haimerl, whose dedication and efforts have substantially contributed to the success of the Summer School.

Last but not least, a special thanks goes to all DGAP staff for their unconditional help and support, without which this International Summer School would not have been possible.



Dina Fakoussa,
Head of Program,
EU-Middle East Forum



Christian Achraimer,
Program Officer,
EU-Middle East Forum

Foreword

Since the toppling of presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, people in Egypt and Tunisia are looking for the right path to a societal and political rebirth. The current historic changes bear a distinct chance that these countries will make essential steps on a path that could lead to genuine democratization. But transformation processes are non-linear, they produce many irritations, frustrations, and difficulties, and hence, societies in Tunisia and Egypt are confronted with numerous challenges and are engaged in a search process for answers to many complex, albeit decisive questions. For decades the two countries faced political stagnation. The whole system was dominated by one ruling party and a powerful president surrounded by an elitist entourage. Political life was characterized by many deficiencies: there were no free and fair elections, no clear separation of powers, no independence of the judiciary, limited freedom of the press and the formation of new political parties was suppressed. In addition to these grave political deficits (with a difference of degree in Egypt and Tunisia) and the fact that followers of the old regime are attempting to sabotage the transformation process, both countries face huge social and economic problems that will certainly increase the complexity of the transitional phase. Socio-economic problems range from a large number of people living in extreme poverty to unemployment, the lack of decent social security and health schemes, and a very high level of corruption and nepotism. These pressing socio-economic issues need also to be addressed immediately with short- and long-term policies if the transformation process is to bear fruit.

Historic shifts in Egypt and Tunisia are received in the West, including Germany and the EU, with very mixed feelings: on the one hand there is surprise followed by admiration at the power and courage of the Egyptian and Tunisian people who defied the most brutal means of repression and decided to speak up and fight for their most basic rights and for a regime change. They completed an essential step, namely the removal of the despotic rulers and part of their corrupt entourage, in what the EU had been preaching for the past decade: democratization of Arab countries. The other side of these developments is tremendous worry on the West's part around its outcome, the new forces and actors it will produce, the degree to which genuine democratization will take place, the wave of migration that swept over Europe, and implications of all these developments for stability and security in the region and Europe. Self-doubts about EU's and Germany's politics and policies towards despotic Arab regimes are equally raised and a process of examination and reorientation is now in place. Whether this will result in more effective policies remains to be seen. The EU wants to and certainly should,

given the high stakes of happenings in its Southern neighborhood, play an active role as a partner—if asked by the other side—in these transformations. Given the strong presence of German development cooperation within the two countries, Germany equally shoulders a responsibility to assist and support. There is deep disappointment and a waning of credibility, however, in the Arab street as a result of Western countries' double standard policy towards authoritarian governments in the region and their hesitation in supporting the revolutions right from the start.

Egypt and Tunisia are facing drastic changes and are confronted with challenges of great magnitude, and the EU is reassessing and reorienting itself to the new realities. Successfully coping with these developments is decisive for security and stability within these countries, within the region, and in Europe. It was precisely these political and economic deficits mentioned above that led to an escalation and an open conflict in the first place. The complexity and at the same time distinctiveness of these developments require dialogue, debate, understanding, but also cooperation and mutual support. DGAP's 15th International Summer School offered a platform for such a debate and for an exchange among young potential policy makers, addressing some of the most crucial issues currently facing Egypt, Tunisia, and the EU. Twenty-eight young advanced students and recent graduates from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco as well as Europe and Turkey came together for twelve days in Berlin to interact, debate, understand, learn, and to get connected.

The specific aims of the International Summer School 2011 were to offer a space for learning and for an exchange of knowledge and experience related to the current transformation processes as well as a sensitization for appropriate and effective policies and the development of joint solutions. The Summer School equally allowed for an intercultural dialogue to increase understanding and trust between young potential policy makers from Arab countries, the EU and Turkey through an exchange about political and societal developments in the respective countries and a sensitization for interests and needs of the different sides. Finally, it supported a pluralistic, tolerant and respectful debating environment and enabled participants from various backgrounds to establish a network of high caliber future actors.

Dina Fakoussa
Head of Program,
EU-Middle East Forum

Christian AchRAINER
Program Officer,
EU-Middle East Forum

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is Germany's network for foreign policy. As an independent, non-partisan, and nonprofit membership organization, think tank, and publisher DGAP has been promoting public debate on foreign policy in Germany for over 50 years. More than 2.000 members—among them renowned representatives from politics, business, academia, and the media—as well as more than 70 companies and foundations support the work of DGAP. DGAP's goals are to promote and contribute to foreign policy debates in Germany, to advise decision makers from politics, business, and civil society, and to inform the public on foreign policy questions and issues. DGAP comprises the think tank, the journal IP, the library and documentation center, and the platform Young DGAP.

- DGAP's think tank works at the junction between politics, the economy, and academia. Its work is interdisciplinary, policy-oriented and covers different areas of German foreign policy, which is dynamic due to a globalized and rapidly changing world. The work encompasses research and publications, high-profile conferences and meetings as well as programs for the advancement of Young Professionals.
- The journal *Internationale Politik* (IP) appears in German as a bimonthly print magazine and in English as an online magazine on German and European foreign policy. IP Journal offers German perspectives on important foreign affairs issues as well as in-depth analyses on central questions of German and European foreign policy by renowned authors and experts in and outside of Germany.
- The DGAP Library and Documentation Center (BiDok) is one of the oldest and most significant specialized libraries in Germany that is open to the public. It holds substantial collections on German foreign and security policy.
- The Young DGAP is an initiative for members of DGAP under the age of 40. The Young DGAP aims at encouraging more young people to take an active interest in foreign and security policy through innovative events such as controversial debates and discussions with renowned decision-makers.

EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)

The EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF) is one of the core programs for the advancement of young academics and professionals at the German Council on Foreign Relations. The forum conceptualizes and organizes dialogue and learning conferences, providing a platform for young experts from European and Middle Eastern states as well as Turkey to exchange ideas, to debate, to jointly develop solutions to security challenges, to promote a better understanding and trust between participants with different backgrounds, and to build up a network of high caliber future actors and decision makers. The underlying idea is that security challenges cannot be tackled by single nation states, but require international dialogue and cooperation. EUMEF is the follow-up project of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking (2006–2010) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy (1997–2005) and focuses on countries in the Middle East and the EU. The EU-Middle East Forum, as well as its predecessors, the International Forum on Strategic Thinking (IFST) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy, have been realized in close cooperation between DGAP and Robert Bosch Stiftung.

1. Topics

EUMEF works on hard security issues such as inter-state conflicts and terrorism and on its soft dimension, addressing subjects like democratization, human rights, climate change, and migration. In 2011 and 2012, EUMEF will primarily look at chances and challenges associated with the current transformation processes in Egypt and Tunisia, and EU and German politics towards these developments.

2. Participants

During the pilot years 2011 and 2012, participants of EUMEF's different conference formats came from the North African countries Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, from Turkey, and from Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EUMEF targets students and young professionals from academia, politics, civil society, media and the corporate sector. Participants are recommended by a network of experts available to the forum.

3. Conference Formats

EUMEF organizes three consecutive but different conference formats. The three-pronged approach enables EUMEF to bring together future leaders at different stages of their career and to realize a sustainable network.

International Summer School (ISS)

For two weeks in July, the ISS gathers 30 highly qualified students at the end of their studies or recent graduates (with 1–2 years of work experience) in Berlin. The focus lies on studies related to the fields of political science, economics, law, and media and communication. Besides lectures and speeches by international renowned experts, discussions, working groups, and workshops on different aspects and angles of an overall security related theme, open inter-cultural dialogue and social activities are part of the program. This allows students to get to know each other and to reflect on differing perspectives and cultures.

New Faces Conference (NFC)

The NFC brings together 15–20 young experts between 27 and 35 years of age for 3–4 days. Participants are young professionals from academia, politics, civil society, media, and the corporate sector. EUMEF organizes two NFCs per year (in autumn and spring), mainly in cooperation with different partner institutions in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia. Each NFC focuses on a specific sub-topic of the summer school's main subject. The NFC provides a forum to discuss security issues with like-minded peers and senior experts. At the same time the conference enables participants to expand their network and to initiate joint projects.

Alumni Conference

Biennially EUMEF invites all former ISS and NFC participants to reconvene in Berlin for three days. The Alumni Conference allows for a strengthening of the network and an exchange among the alumni. Subjects addressed are derived from up-to-date security challenges and topics of the former conferences and summer schools. Participants also get the chance to present initiatives and projects and to explore cooperation channels with other alumni. The last Alumni Conference took place in November 2012.

4. Objectives

- Reflection and analysis of security challenges and the sensitization for effective solutions and policies on a national and EU level
- Exchange of know-how and experiences
- Promotion of an intercultural dialogue to increase understanding and trust between young potential policy makers from Arab countries, the EU, and Turkey
- Promotion of a pluralistic, tolerant, and respectful debating environment
- Establishing a network of high caliber future actors from North Africa, the EU, and Turkey.

5. Team

Head of Program: Dina Fakoussa-Behrens <fakoussa@dgap.org>

Program Officer: Christian Achraimer <achraimer@dgap.org>

Program Assistant: Anja Runge <runge@dgap.org>.

Agenda

Monday, 11 July

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| 09:00–09:30 | <p>Opening of the 15th International Summer School
 Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director
 of the Research Institute, DGAP
 Stella Voutta, Program Officer, International Relations
 Western Europe, America, Turkey, Japan, India, Robert
 Bosch Stiftung
 Bernd Asbach, Head of Middle East Department,
 Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung—The Green Political Foundation</p> |
| 10:00–11:00 | <p>Getting to know DGAP—The Role of a German
Think Tank
 Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director
 of the Research Institute, DGAP</p> |
| 11:30–13:00 | <p>Between Transformation and Democracy—Some
Conceptual Remarks
 Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders, Head of the Center for Middle
 Eastern and North African Studies, Freie Universität
 Berlin, Germany</p> |
| 13:00–14:00 | Lunch at DGAP |
| 14:00–15:00 | <p>Introduction and Instructions to the Working
Groups
 Dina Fakoussa, Head of Program, EU-Middle East
 Forum
 Christian AchRAINER, Program Officer, EU-Middle East
 Forum</p> |
| 15:00–19:00 | “Scavenger Hunt” through Berlin |
| 19:00 | Dinner at DGAP |

Tuesday, 12 July

- 09:00–10:30** **Presentation of Scavenger Hunt Results**
- 11:00–12:30** **Between Human Development, Human Security, and National Security**
Sascha Werthes, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
- 12:30–13:15** Lunch at DGAP
- 13:15–18:30** **Debating Workshop**
Dominic Hildebrand, Clemens Lechner, and Philipp Stiehl (Streitkultur e. V.)
- 18:30–19:30** Dinner at DGAP
- 20:00–21:30** **Panel Debate (organized together with Streitkultur Berlin e. V.): Should the West use Military Force to remove Despotic Regimes?**



Heba from Egypt is posing a question during the panel debate

Wednesday, 13 July

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 09:00–10:30 | <p>Institutionalization of Movements and the Formation of New Political Parties—How to become Viable Forces</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor for Political Science at Cairo University and Executive Director of Partners-in-Development for Research, Consulting and Training, Cairo, Egypt</p> |
| 11:00–12:30 | <p>Transitional Justice in Post-Authoritarian Settings</p> <p>Teresa Koloma Beck, PhD, Research Associate at the Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg, Germany</p> |
| 12:30–13:30 | <p>Lunch at DGAP</p> |
| 15:00–18:00 | <p>Visit to the Office of the Federal Commissioner for preserving the records of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU)</p> <p>Dealing with the State Security of Despotic Regimes—Germany’s Experience with the STASI and Lessons Learned for Egypt and Tunisia</p> <p>Joachim Förster, Head of Department AU (Auskunft/Verwendung von Unterlagen) of the BStU</p> |

Thursday, 14 July

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 09:00–10:30 | Socio-Economic Malaise as a Security Threat—
Which Reforms for North Africa?
Dr. Markus Loewe, Senior Economist at Department
II: Competitiveness and Social Development, German
Development Institute (die), Bonn, Germany |
| 11:00–13:30 | Working Group Session |
| 13:30–14:30 | Lunch at DGAP |
| 14:30–16:00 | Development and Agenda of Islamist Forces in Tu-
nisia and Egypt—Implications for the Democratiza-
tion Process
Prof. Dr. Fawaz Gerges, Director of the Middle East
Centre at the London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE), UK |
| 16:30–18:00 | Sustainability of Processes—Evolution as a Guide
Frederik Fleischmann, Consultant at Evoco GmbH,
Berlin, Germany |
| 18:00 | Dinner at DGAP |

Friday, 15 July

09:30–11:15

**Visit to the Federal Ministry of Defence
The Role of the Military in a Democratic System
and Ongoing Operations of the German Armed
Forces**

Major General Karl Müllner, ACOS Politico-Military
Affairs and Arms Control, Federal Ministry of Defence,
Berlin, Germany

11:15–12:30

Reception and Lunch at the Ministry of Defence

14:00–15:30

**Visit to infratest dimap
Electoral and Political Research in Democratic Sys-
tems—Role, Methods and Instruments**
Jürgen Hofrichter, Head of Election Research



The participants in front of Infratest dimap

Sunday, 17 July

15:30–17:00 **Visit to the Reichstag, Seat of the German Parliament**

Monday, 18 July

09:00–10:30 **Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe—Same but Different**
 Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Polish Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw, Poland

11:00–12:30 **Transition in Indonesia—A Crisis of Democratic Governance?**
 PD Dr. Andreas Ufen, Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany

12:30–13:30 Lunch at DGAP

13:30–16:00 **Working Group Session**

16:30–17:30 **Debate 1: Neoliberalism fails to achieve Social Justice.**
Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2

17:30–18:30 **Debate 2: Party Officials of Former Autocratic Regimes should be barred from Political Life altogether.**
Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4

18:30 Dinner at DGAP

Tuesday, 19 July

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 09:00–10:30 | The EU Neighborhood Policy—Critical Review and the Way Forward
Almut Möller, Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim-Center for European Policy Studies, DGAP |
| 11:00–12:30 | Germany’s Development Cooperation with North Africa—Lessons Learnt and New Approaches?
Laura Fuesers, Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Henriette Sachse, Desk Officer for Syria, Jordan, Iraq at the Near and Middle East Division, Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) |
| 12:30–13:30 | Lunch at DGAP |
| 13:30–16:00 | Working Group Session |
| 17:00–18:30 | Visit to taz.die tageszeitung
The Media in Transformation Processes—Constructivism and Conflict Sensitivity
Beate Seel, Head of the Department International Affairs, taz |

Wednesday, 20 July

- 09:00–10:30** **Potentials and Limits of Turkey as a Partner in the Arab Region**
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Chairman of the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
- 11:00–13:00** **Working Group Session**
- 13:00–14:00 Lunch at DGAP
- 14:00–16:00** **Working Group Session**
- 16:30–18:00** **Developments in Syria—Implications Nationally, Regionally, and Internationally**
Dr. Muriel Asseburg, Head of Research Division “Middle East and Africa,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, Germany
- 18:00 Dinner at DGAP



Discussions in small working groups are an important part of the Summer School

Thursday, 21 July

09:00–11:00	Working Group Session
11:30–12:30	Debate 1: Should the Military in Post-Authoritarian Settings have Constitutional Authority to safeguard the Values and Principles of the State? Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2
12:30–13:30	Debate 2: Should the EU recognize the Legitimate Election of Political Forces who do not subscribe to Liberal, Secular Values? Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4
13:30–14:30	Lunch at DGAP
14:30–15:30	Debate 3: Only a Secular State can be a Democratic State. Winner Debate 1 vs. Winner Debate 2
19:30	Dinner & Farewell Party



Umberto from Italy is arguing passionately

List of Participants

Heba **Amr Hussein**, Egypt
Anna **Apostolidou**, Greece
Syrine **Ayadi**, Tunisia
Esra **Bakkalbaşıoğlu**, Turkey
Farida **Belkacem**, France
Hinda **Bouddane**, Morocco
Giorgia **Chillè**, Italy
Sondos **El-Faramawy**, Egypt
Schams **El Ghoneimi**, France/Egypt
Omar **El Hyani**, Morocco
Zeyad **El Kelani**, Egypt
Sophie **Etzold**, Germany
Randa **Fahmy**, Egypt
Lea **Fröhlich**, Germany
Selim **Koru**, Turkey
Umberto **Marengo**, Italy
Wiem **Melki**, Tunisia
Somaia **Metwalli El Sayed**, Egypt
Alejandra **Morales**, Spain
Ahmed **Morsy**, Egypt
Adam **Nuhi**, United Kingdom
Elif **Özkaragöz**, Turkey
Jakob **Pump**, Germany
Marwa **Rdifi**, Tunisia
Anne-Sophie **Reichert**, Germany
Gerasimos **Tsourapas**, Greece
Pepijn **van Houwelingen**, The Netherlands/UK
Sally **Zohney**, Egypt

Lectures at DGAP

The following pages provide a summary of each speaker's contribution in the order of their appearance at DGAP's International Summer School. Summaries of presentations held during visits to other political institutions can be found in the following chapter (p. 56).

Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders: “Between Transformation and Democracy—A Spotlight on Egypt”

Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders, Head of the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin, opened the 15th International Summer School with her lecture. Ms Harders stressed how important and inspiring it is to be with young people in these times, to listen to them and their own impressions as they are the ones who shape and thrive on change. While lecturing, she provided the participants ample opportunity to introduce their own ideas and experiences and exchange their opinions with her and each other.

Ms Harders began with some remarks about the protests' characteristics. She highlighted significant differences among the countries and the circumstances under which the protests had taken place. At the same time she criticized that these differences were often neglected by German and other “Western” media, who instead portrayed the protests in a very culturalist, homogenized manner. Elaborating on the role of “new media,” Ms Harders emphasized that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are in her opinion no “Facebook Revolutions.” She admitted that new social media networks like Facebook and Twitter have reduced opportunity costs for the protesters by vastly facilitating information flows and thus stimulating popular participation. The regimes also used them for their own purposes: in Egypt, for example, the mobile networks were shut down for three days and still the demonstrations continued, simply because word of mouth continues to be the most effective means of communication. Additionally, the “new media” are a potential threat to the protests as they also provide means of generating information about protests that can be turned against the protestors. Nevertheless, both Internet and Satellite TV—most visible Al Jazeera—have been important in terms of mobilization, as they have politicized a structural crisis and have influenced the “political culture” over the long run. Ms Harders also shared her view with the participants that the protests were also partly directed against authoritarian and paternalistic structures in families, against current gender relations etc., and that this social rebellion has also been triggered and influenced by the media. In addition to the media, protest experience gained by many people in Tunisia and Egypt over the last decade has been of great importance for the current protests. Both the

Kefaya movement and the independent labour movement in Egypt and the trade unions' protest in Tunisia provided valuable protest experience.

After these remarks about some of the protests' characteristics Ms Harders referred to the aftermath of the protests and the current feelings of hope, not ignoring, however, the insecurity and anxiousness felt about the political future of the countries. She anticipated that it might be necessary to protest continually and to put pressure on the people in power over and over again. Even though this might be very exhausting, she stated that the ongoing practice of protests is exactly the experience a democracy needs: a democracy survives only through living it out. Importantly, these experiences would generate and reinforce a feeling of citizenship and ownership amongst the people. Subsequently Ms Harders discussed some of the root causes of the protests together with the participants. They agreed that the central cause has been a crisis of legitimacy due to a political, economic and social crisis, which has been caused by a "transformation without transition." The participants offered insights into their own experiences, discussed the role of media in general and of Al Jazeera in different countries in particular. Also the definition of a "revolution" and the question why the protests had begun at this specific point of time were addressed.

Ms Harders continued her lecture by providing the participants with theoretical background to facilitate an analytical examination of the revolution in both coun-



Prof. Cilja Harders during her intervention

tries. She listed some dimensions of analysis: the relationship between poverty and wealth especially concerning the feeling of injustice and deprivation, the regime type, the intensity of social movements and mobilization as well as the political culture, access to media, the power and position of the army, the position of militia and historical experiences with democracy and war, social, ethnic and religious cleavages and the international context (intervention, colonialization, regional conflicts).

She pointed out that different theoretical approaches are necessary in order to understand processes of transformation. For example political regime analysis alone has not been able to grasp and understand the current events, however social movement theory offers helpful insights in this regard. Being asked for “conditions for a successful transformation” Ms Harders argued that these processes are complex and that the discussion about preconditions does not lead very far. There are no “stages” to democracy. As modernization theory for example claims, sound economic conditions can be very important, they, however, do not necessarily result in a successful transformation. Many factors and conditions play a role. Elaborating on the old system of Arab authoritarian republics Ms Harders emphasized that besides the strategy of repression there had been other adaption strategies used by the regimes to hold on to power, like informalization, islamization, liberalization and cooptation, resulting in a social contract of informality. Ms Harders argued that repression is a very important strategy but it is not enough to suppress people and to eliminate opposition. Based on this argument she expressed hope that Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran would not be able to hold on to power forever.

Sascha Werthes: “Between Human Development, Human Security, and National Security—The Need for Thresholds for People’s Welfare and Dignity and their Intergration into National and International Policy”

Sascha Werthes, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) and Researcher at the Faculty of Social Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen gave a lecture on the concept of Human Security. Mr Werthes provided the participants with a broad overview of the concept of human security. In the subsequent discussion the methodological and conceptual problems and (dis-) advantages of the concept as well as the challenges for Tunisia and Egypt in terms of human security were discussed.

Mr Werthes started his lecture by elaborating on the term “security.” The term was traditionally defined in a very narrow manner, especially during the Cold War. Security was seen as an issue of sovereignty: equated with threats to a country’s

borders it was assumed that security threats would mainly emanate from external sources. Only after the end of the Cold War, due to, *inter alia*, rising numbers of people dying of hunger and diseases and a high number of intra-state conflicts, this state-centric view was challenged. The term “human security” was first mentioned in 1994 in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The report argued that the traditional view on security had to be expanded and that security and stability in the world could only be achieved by putting the individual in focus. It stated that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in seven areas: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security. Over time two different schools of thought emerged, which differ in terms of the scope of protection and the proper instruments and mechanisms: the “narrow school” concentrates on the “freedom from fear,” mainly referring to the threat of political violence to people by the state or other political actors. It sees this focus as a necessary means to pursue the goal of human security successfully. Contrary to that, the “broad school” defines human security not only as “freedom from fear” but also as a “freedom from want.” Ensuring human security in these broad terms therefore requires not only addressing violence but also hunger, diseases etc. This school of thought is often criticized for promoting a concept that is too broad and not manageable. Mr Werthes argued that this broad view is nevertheless necessary, even though it requires further prioritization. Beside the UNDP-Report of 1994 a second document was of great importance for the advancement and further development of the concept of human security. The report “Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People” by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was published in 2003. In the report more attention was given to the nexus between development and security. According to the report the two concepts are deeply intertwined and mutually dependent. Human security is defined as a particular form of human development. It is argued that underdevelopment and horizontal inequalities for instance may also cause insecurity, political violence, and conflict. According to Mr Werthes the CHS-approach reflects and reconciles ongoing debates and the two schools of thought. In order to achieve human security it suggests an accomplishment of the traditional “top down” approach of protection with a “bottom up” approach, which stresses the empowerment of people.

Asked for the added value of the concept Mr Werthes elaborated that human security can mainly serve as an analytical tool as well as a political leitmotif. It bases itself in other well-established concepts to complement and unify them. The concept, understood as in the CHS-report, especially bridges the development-security divide. As a political tool it offers explanation and orientation by identifying priority areas for action. It can be helpful in new areas where development and

security policy meet and can guide coordination. Finally and most importantly it can motivate and mobilize political actors. The concept makes aware of the fact that it is necessary to create programs and policies in an encompassing way, as it stresses the interconnectedness and dependencies between development, stability, and security. Mr Werthes reiterated the new “alarm” function, however, emphasized that the concept still needs prioritization. The labeling of problems with the term “security” would increase the likelihood of political action. Mr Werthes named the Ottawa convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines as well as the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as illustrative cases for an effective mobilization of political forces. The banning of landmines and the inception of the ICC are successful examples where diverse political alliances guided by the common idea of human security managed to reach political solutions. Also the idea of targeted or selected sanctions has been influenced by this concept.

Different participants pointed to the problem of a missing common definition of “human security” as well as to the potential overlap with other concepts like human rights or the rule of law. Werthes replied that the concept of human security is less frequently used today and admitted that many policies and actions could also be done under the human rights agenda or under human development projects. Additionally Mr Werthes admitted that a missing common definition might be problematic in academic terms. Yet he stressed that this definitional overstretch could be practical in political terms, as these “boundary concepts” enable people from all over the world to communicate about issues. In his concluding remarks Mr Werthes stressed again the analytical relevance of the concept: by collecting and generating disaggregate data of different geographic locations an early warning system could be developed. This would help policy-makers and civil society determine which regions require which kind of policies. He concluded that human security remains a very contested yet still relevant concept, which can be of analytical and practical value if it is properly applied and if priorities are defined.

Prof. Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid: “Institutionalization of Movements and the Formation of New Political Parties—How to become Viable Forces”

Prof. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor for Political Science at Cairo University and Executive Director of Partners-in-Development for Research, Consulting and Training, focused in his lecture on the challenges for new political actors to become viable forces after the toppling of presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali. Having lived under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule for decades, oppositional movements and individuals critical of the regime suffered from repression and oppres-

sion and now face the challenge to institutionalize their movements, form political parties, and more generally become active and visible political actors. Only if they succeed in doing so, they will be able to participate in the future decision-making process and only then a truly pluralistic system can evolve. Some movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, have been more successful in that respect, not least because they could build on a strong organizational basis, while others like the leftist and secular forces still struggle to speak with one voice and to get organized.

At the beginning of his intervention, Mr Al-Sayyid pointed out several institutionalization controversies, which revolve around the question of how the transitional period in Egypt should be run. Firstly, he elaborated on the possibility of introducing a civil-military presidential council, which could manage and oversee the transition. Secondly, he highlighted the importance of the calendar of transition, i. e. should the constitution be written first, followed by legislative and presidential elections, or should elections be held before the writing of the constitution begins? Thirdly, he stated that there is a controversial discussion about whether Egypt should adopt a presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary system of government. And finally, Mr Al-Sayyid emphasized the ongoing debate on the drafting of new laws regarding the formation of political parties and new electoral laws. He stressed that this topic is often overlooked as the first three controversies draw all the attention to themselves. Nevertheless, new electoral laws and regula-



Prof. Mustapha Al-Sayyid gave a lecture on the institutionalization of movements

tions for the formation of new parties are decisive reforms, which in turn are of high importance for introducing real change.

Mr Al-Sayyid highlighted two distinctive features of the Egyptian revolution. He argued that the revolutionaries have been a very heterogeneous and unorganized group of people. They were united in their demand for more justice and freedom, better living conditions, and their criticism of the corrupt regime. But they were not unified in one major opposition movement, came from very diverse religious, socio-economic, and political backgrounds, and also articulated different priorities. The second feature that Mr Al-Sayyid pointed out was that the revolutionaries, who initiated and coordinated the protests in the first place, did not succeed in gaining influence, but that mainly other groups profited and will probably come to power. He argued that the revolutionaries are still politically marginalized as they were not able to form one unified bloc. In contrast, movements that did not stand at the forefront of the protests like the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the situation and now portray themselves as the only reliable and realistic alternative to the old regime.

According to Mr Al-Sayyid, revolutionaries and other former opposition movements and individuals have several options. They can try to either establish their own party, join other new parties, join established parties, or try to gain legal recognition for former underground movements and shift to civil society action. Hence the legal conditions for the formation of new parties are of great significance, but at least equally decisive are available resources like experienced cadres, funding, communication skills, access to media, or strategic contacts. Currently, the groups that meet most of these criteria and which are in the best position to become influential actors are Islamist groups. The Muslim Brotherhood can build on well-established organizational structures, sufficient funding, a long history as an oppositional movement, a broad network of supporters, experienced members, and long-standing support from society. Some of these criteria are met by liberal parties supported by wealthy businessmen but they still can hardly rival with the Brotherhood. The young revolutionaries on the other hand lack most of these resources, rendering competition on an equal footing unrealistic, especially in the short-run. Moreover, they have to overcome the fragmentation among the different actors and the challenge of reconciling party discourses with the conservative Egyptian culture. This is an inevitable necessity to reach the masses and to gain support from broad sectors of the population.

Taking all these factors into account, Mr Al-Sayyid concluded that the revolutionaries might be the losers of the revolution in the long run. Nevertheless, he ruled

out that the Muslim Brotherhood will govern Egypt alone in the near future. He does not expect the Brotherhood to win the overall majority in any election, meaning they will be forced to form a coalition, and secondly, he stated that there would be too much resistance in the Egyptian society against any attempt by the Brotherhood or any other force to become the hegemonic ruler of the country.

Teresa Koloma-Beck, PhD: “Transitional Justice in Post-Authoritarian Settings”

Ms Teresa Koloma-Beck, PhD, Research Associate at the Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg, provided the participants with a short overview of the different approaches of transitional justice and their emergence. Referring to German history, especially examples of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and experiences by herself and her grandparents, she illustrated the concept and its challenges. This pictorial way of lecturing allowed the participants to gain a very vivid and personal insight into the concept of transitional justice.

Ms Koloma-Beck started her lecture by reflecting on the German case of Brandenburg and the lustration process, which had taken place in the state of Brandenburg after the fall of the Berlin wall. A newly established commission has come to the conclusion that the Stasi past of many members of parliament, members of government, and especially the former premier of Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe, has not been examined thoroughly enough. There are allegations that his involve-



Ms Koloma-Beck is listening to a question from the audience

ment has prevented a true process of historical reappraisal. The report by the commission has stimulated heated debates and has generated a lot of public attention. After this opening case study, which illustrated the significance and potentially far-reaching consequences of transitional justice approaches, Ms Koloma-Beck elaborated on the concept and history of transitional justice. Transitional justice commonly refers to processes and mechanisms that address the legacy of past violence in order to promote the transition to peace after systematic human rights abuses. One can distinguish between two basic notions of justice: on the one hand there is retributive justice, which foresees punishment as central, appropriate response to committed atrocities and mainly encompasses judicial prosecution and court trials as instruments. On the other hand there is restorative justice, which focuses on the need of victims and perpetrators alike and aims at restoring their relationship. This notion is based on the idea of a participatory approach and does not only involve state agencies but also non-state actors on different levels. The most prominent instrument besides public apologies are Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC). These commissions can be found in different forms and kinds in many countries, having their origin in Latin America and with the best-known TRC in South-Africa. The distinction between these two notions of justice is mainly of an analytical character. In practice, instruments often involve both elements and they can be seen as complementary. Giving a short overview over the emergence, development and pursuit of transitional justice Ms Koloma-Beck underlined that the idea is not new but has existed in different forms in history, e.g. in shape of reparations. The contemporary notion of transitional justice dates back to post World War II and developed with major events such as the end of the Cold War. The third phase of transitional justice is associated with contemporary conditions of persistent conflict, which lay the foundation for a normalization of transitional justice. Being exceptional at the beginning transitional justice has turned into a rather conventional tool in peacemaking.

After this brief conceptual and historical background Ms Koloma-Beck pointed to some potential traps and challenges for transitional justice. While she emphasized that transitional justice can play a key role in transitions and is often supported politically and financially, she noted that transitional justice instruments also operate in an area of tension between justice and peace. As seeking justice in the aftermath of violent conflict may often imply a “naming and shaming” procedure, it could potentially be a source of conflict, incite resentment and even lead to a destabilization of the country, jeopardizing short-term peace-building efforts. According to Ms Koloma-Beck there are two other important problems to name beside this tension between justice and peace. Firstly, there is the risk of overestimating the potential transformative power of transitional justice. Ms Koloma-Beck sees

potential for transitional justice to open up spaces for transformation and provide glimpses of a common future. At the same time, however, it cannot change deep-rooted problems and move society into this future. Referring to the case of East-Germany Ms Koloma-Beck argued that socio-economic justice for example has not been achieved and is still a very central issue for many East Germans. Relating to this, Ms Koloma-Beck outlined that the idea of transitional justice is not only about truth but also about accountability. Referring again to the Brandenburg case, she described how difficult it can be to sort out accountability, as authoritarian rule imposes very complex and internally contradicting relationships to the powerful upon the individual.

Ms Koloma-Beck named power blindness towards transitional justice as a second central problem, i.e. the processes are influenced by national and international power relations. Seldom is there “one truth,” as truth depends on one’s own perspective and position. Transitional justice processes do not only reveal truth, but are rather an arena where an acknowledged version of history is negotiated. These negotiations are of course influenced and shaped by the distribution of power among the negotiating parties. Also on an international level the power relations are of great importance. Some argue that transitional justice is misused as an industry for the export of certain Western norms and principles. Ms Koloma-Beck warned that this should not be the way in which transitional justice is understood: transitional justice should not be seen as an end in itself but rather a process that can help a society to move from war and conflict to peace. She emphasized that resources exist in every society, institutions and customs for justice, which should be acknowledged and taken into account. Referring to this Ms Koloma-Beck posed the question of whether there is really only one concept of justice in a globalized world or rather multiple ones. She encouraged the ISS’s participants to think about this question and to try to find their own solutions to this.

In the subsequent discussion the participants tried to find answers for themselves and their own countries on how to deal with a legacy of past violence. Ms Koloma-Beck emphasized the context-dependency of every case not only on a national but also on an individual level. Illustrating this, Ms Koloma-Beck referred to different cases. In Mozambique for example, where Ms Koloma-Beck has conducted extensive field-research, peace has been traded for justice. In Poland—as in contrast to Germany—files by the secret police have not been opened for many years to secure societal peace. Giving the example of her own family she told the participants that her grandparents had seen their Stasi files and were very shocked about its content and how people in their surrounding had spied on them. Afterwards, she told the participants, they wished they had not seen their files. Discuss-

ing the problem of creating a very official history and how to circumvent this problem Ms Koloma-Beck suggested that processes which are very close to the ground and try to include different people and views are the most successful. And socio-economic inequality and feelings of injustice can be important and decisive factors for stability. Closing up the lecture and discussion, Ms Koloma-Beck and the ISS's participants agreed that these factors will be especially important in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt.


Dr. Markus Loewe: “Socio-Economic Malaise as a Security Threat—Which Reforms for North Africa?”

Dr. Markus Loewe, Senior Economist at the German Development Institute (DIE) in Bonn offered insights into the social policies of the region and outlined the policy shortcomings and the future implications these might have for North Africa. Dr. Loewe's recommendations for social policy reform in the region were subsequently discussed together with the ISS's participants.

Dr. Loewe underlined that there are three main goals which social policies generally pursue: firstly they have social goals, like preventing people from falling into poverty, supporting people who have fallen into poverty or helping people to escape from it. Secondly, social policies follow economic goals, like encouraging people to take risks, to invest in physical and human capital and to become economically active thereby boosting economic growth. Finally, social policies have political goals like contributing to social inclusion and justice, as well as strengthening social cohesion and stabilizing and appeasing society and the political system. Posing the question to what extent social policies in the region have contributed to the attainment of these goals, Mr Loewe argued that the social goals have only been fulfilled to a very limited degree. Social policies have mainly benefited the urban middle classes rather than the poor. Also economic goals have only been attained to a very limited degree: social policies cover employees rather than the self-employed, and promotional active labour market policies are largely missing in most countries of the MENA region. In contrast, social policies have indeed had significant effects on political goals. However they have not effected the political goals of society in general and contributed to social justice. Rather, they have only benefited the regimes in power and their clientele, supporting social exclusion instead of inclusion. Why have social policies not contributed to the attainment of the goals?

According to Dr. Loewe the main problem of social policies is not the funding but rather the implementation of these policies. Social policies are characterized by a coverage gap, as only certain parts of the population benefit and great parts

are completely left out. In Egypt for example 25 per cent of its GDP is spent on social protection, but those parts of the population which are mostly in need of assistance are insufficiently targeted. Additionally, the social insurance and health sector are heavily segmented. Low income groups are discriminated, while powerful groups and the urban middle classes are preferentially treated. For instance, armed forces and high ranking state employees, which only represent 8 per cent of the population, receive very generous pensions and benefit from a separate high-standard health system. This practice creates a class society through the system of social protection and results in a redistribution of public funds from the poor to the urban middle class. Even subsidies which should especially target the poor do not sufficiently fulfill their aims. For example food subsidies benefit all segments of the population, not mainly the poor, and energy subsidies are mainly advantageous for the richest people in society. While public social assistance schemes would be a suitable way to help the poor, expenditures on them are negligible. A very important problem of social policies and its funds are their inefficiency due to high administrative costs and an unreasonable use of instruments. In terms of social transfer spending different schemes coexist without proper coordination, which leads to high administrative costs, leakages and a duplication of efforts. Social policies are one of the regimes' main resources of legitimacy. Therefore the old regimes have done anything possible to prevent non-state actors to become active in social policies by applying very restrictive legislation. Private transfers or



Dr. Markus Loewe is illustrating his argument

self-help initiatives also hardly play a role in the MENA region, which also distinguishes it from other world regions.

Mr. Loewe firstly suggested a few measurements which are rather easy to recommend and rather uncontested: reducing administrative costs in all social systems, running more labour-intensive public works in the future, reforming investment policies and reducing the contribution rates of social insurance schemes while raising the threshold on income for which contributions have to be paid. Mr Loewe subsequently gave further recommendations that were more controversial and posed more of a challenge in terms of convincing policy-makers. These recommendations were intensively discussed by Dr. Loewe and the ISS' participants: firstly, the cutting of energy subsidies and their redirection to cash transfers to the people for labour market policies and social assistance. Secondly, a liberalization of legislation in order to ease the entry of workers and enterprises to the formal sector. Finally, the extension of coverage of social insurance to additional groups of the population. In the discussion, rigorous attention was paid to the advantages and disadvantages of direct cash transfers in comparison to investments. The group discussed the potential problems for the implementation of direct cash transfers and the cutting of energy subsidies. Additionally, the reasons why people do not enroll in the schemes and the problem of certain kinds of investment behavior were touched on in the discussion. Dr. Loewe ended his lecture and the discussion by drawing the conclusion that the main problem is the unwillingness of the people in power to change the current system of social policies as it serves their own and their clientele's particular interests. After the toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt great challenges in terms of social policy reform lie ahead. Tackling these problems and the implementation of reasonable and practicable solutions is pertinent to the security of the region.

Prof. Fawaz Gerges: “Development and Agenda of Islamist Forces in Tunisia and Egypt—Implications for the Democratization Process”

Prof. Dr. Fawaz Gerges, Director of the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) began his lecture by stating that over the last twenty years a political paradigm of the MENA region and its societies has dominated political and academic debates in the US and GB. He argued that the region and its people have been seen through a “bipolar prism” of “Islamists vs. dictators.” This simplistic view has neglected societal segments in between those extremes and crudely assumes that the small number of so-called “Islamists” or “extremists” speaks for a powerful segment of muslim society. Moreover it suggests that there is “no culture for democracy” in the region. Prof. Dr. Gerges emphasized that this very oversimplified ideological paradigm has become deeply

entrenched among British and American political and academic circles, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Mr Gerges posed the question whether these political and academic circles have drawn any lessons from the experiences of the last months of protests in the region. According to him the minority of Islamists has been more vocal over the last years, while the silent majority has been overheard and its social weight has been overlooked for a long time. The protests have uncovered and brought this significant majority to prominence. He expressed hope that the protests would make aware of the fact that Islamists are only one part of a very complex mosaic within society, that these forces are important but not the driving force behind the uprisings in any of the countries. Mr Gerges emphasized that Islamists are not a monolithic bloc but are rather characterized by many internal divisions among different groups and among generations. Mentioning the example of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt he outlined that the unifying sense of opposition to a secular dictatorship has faded and various factions are moving towards the political center. Illustrative for this is the presidential candidacy of Dr. Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a popular leader of the MB, who is however not running as a Brotherhood candidate but rather as an independent and mainly represents the MB-youth. According to Gerges there are two main problems related to the influence of Islamist forces: Firstly, especially in Egypt, other groups and parties are not very well organized so far. Thus, it would be very likely that the Islamists would win the elections. Secondly,



Prof. Fawaz Gerges during his talk

Islamist forces have not come up with many ideas about the political system, no proper political theorizing has taken place and they have not worked on many critical issues. Even though they have already gone a long way there is still progress to be made especially on issues concerning minorities and women. Prof. Dr. Gerges argued that so far “morality” seems to be more important than issues like social development, open society or free economy. On the same hand he expressed hope that with their political engagement they would come up with ideas on important issues. In these terms Mr Gerges designated the Islamists in Turkey, represented by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) as a potential role model: Turkey’s current prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party have accepted the rules of the political game and have won three consecutive elections—debunking the view that Islam and democracy cannot coexist.

In the ensuing debate after Prof. Dr. Gerges’ lecture the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, its internal divisions and the term of Islamists in general was mooted. Also the example of the AKP, which has contradicted traditional theories and assumptions about the transformation of religious-based social movements, was discussed. Summing up his lecture Prof. Dr. Gerges stressed the present volatile situation, especially in Egypt. Still no one knew how Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Nahda in Tunisia would behave, what percentage of votes they would gain and what kind of alliances they would forge. In the case of Egypt he expressed concern about the potential alliance between the army and “mainstream Islamists.” Thus, the next two or three years will be critical as only time can tell how societies will evolve. His last remark concerning the developments in the region and the role of Islamist forces was fairly optimistic: he claimed that the protests represented a psychological rupture for the MENA region, which would not allow for a return to old political structures. The events resembled the “Arab world’s Berlin moment” and Prof. Dr. Gerges expressed hope that although it may take a few years the “wall” will not be erected again.

Frederik Fleischmann: “Sustainability of Processes—Evolutionary Management as a Guide”

Frederik Fleischmann, Consultant at Evoco GmbH, Berlin, introduced in his lecture the concept of evolutionary management, which is a management model for organizations and considers processes in and between organizations as organic processes of life, following the laws and principles of nature. By applying this approach, one can use comparable processes from nature as a basis for creating organizational processes in the business world. Hence, it uses nature and evolution as a basis for sustainability strategies. The aim was to explore possible linkages to sustainability of political systems and organizations.

Using evolutionary management, one can draw several conclusions when it comes to organizational development. Thereby, it is important to keep in mind that every organization has its own history with its specific qualities, traditions, and myth. Nevertheless, analyses of previous evolutionary developments can support decision-making in future projects. For instance, the past clearly shows that evolution doesn't follow a stringent upward trend and changes its direction. Those changes often happen through detours and jumps. Moreover, evolutionary management can give hints on the interlinkages between decline, innovation and preservation. In this context, Mr Fleischmann highlighted that 99 percent of all species that ever lived are extinct, but that nature always found a way and hence, is the biggest innovator on our planet. At the same time, 80 percent of the genes of mice and humans are identical, which shows that nature not always creates completely new creatures. But it improves itself constantly by producing new designs/shapes and by retaining and recombining the approved. A good example for such a procedure in the business world is Apple's iPhone: it includes only very few innovations but combines different already existing ideas with a new innovative design and an excellent marketing strategy.

Mr Fleischmann explained that the average life-span of a company is 18 years. According to the Shell-Report, long-existing companies show some common key factors: 1) they are sensitive to their environment, 2) they are cohesive with a strong sense of identity, 3) they are open-minded about different developments and act



Frederik Fleischmann during the Q&A-session

tolerantly towards new approaches, and 4) they are conservative in financing. After his presentation, Mr Fleischmann discussed with the students if and how this approach might be useful for the recent developments in Egypt and Tunisia. For instance, it was discussed in how far political parties and civil society organizations can be developed in a sustainable manner by using evolutionary management, as well as the sustainability of the change itself. Even though some skeptical voices were raised, many links were discovered.

Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz: “Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe—Same but Different”

Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, former Polish defense minister and previous member and spokesman of the Polish trade union Solidarność, gave a very vivid lecture about democratization in Poland. His lecture evoked great interest among the participants and they asked manyfold questions about his own experiences within the trade union and during the transitional phase in his home country.

Dr. Onyszkiewicz elaborated on how change came about in Poland and how Solidarność successfully contributed to it. He portrayed Poland's history as one of constant struggle against conquest and occupation at the hands of external actors, with the Polish people forever fighting for their freedom and independence. This tradition of resorting to violent means changed in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to different historical events: firstly, the trauma of the end of the Second World War, in which a Polish uprising had caused the total destruction of the Polish capital by German forces. Secondly, the uprising in Hungary in 1956, which had been quashed by Soviet forces, and finally the Prague spring which also resulted in a violent crackdown. All these events, in which uprisings had ended in counter-violence by external forces led to deliberations among Polish intellectuals and different societal groups that political change would have to come from within the society and that they should instead resort to peaceful means to achieve their aims. Based on these considerations a civic committee was established in 1976 following a wave of strikes that had taken place to protest against a high price increase of many basic commodities. Its members tried to find a legal framework under which a strike for change could be organized and peaceful means of protest could be applied. Poland had adopted a convention by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that allowed for the establishment of trade unions. This “legal loophole” was soon discovered and seemed to be a possibility for Poles to organize themselves and circumvent possible prohibition by the communist authorities. It was merely necessary to inform the authorities about its foundation and existence. Thus, trade unions were established and even though they were very small at the beginning they rapidly gained experience and developed stable orga-

nizational structures. In the 1980s another rise of costs especially for food and other basic commodities took place. This provoked a general strike by the independent trade unions. Lech Wałęsa led one of these strike committees. Due to its large scale the government felt pressured and started to negotiate with the union's leaders. The protests by the trade unions went far beyond the issue of food prices: political demands were raised and the establishment of political parties was requested. Over time, the trade union Solidarność took on more and more activities, it became more politicized and the number of its members sharply increased up to 10 million.

The only answer for the authorities to this growing power and influence of Solidarność seemed to be to introduce martial law in 1981. The movement was consequently driven underground. Despite this repression the union was not completely destroyed. On the contrary the union was pursuing more and more underground activities inter alia an underground press that produced a weekly paper with a circulation of 60,000 copies. Over the years it became clear that the imposition of martial law could neither defuse growing social unrest nor diminish the trade union's societal and political influence. Realizing this, the government authorities offered to negotiate with the movement in 1988. A "Round table" with members of government, Solidarność and other oppositional groups was established. Solidarność was ready to accept a change from a totalitarian regime to an autocratic regime that offered only certain basic freedoms. At the same time there



Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz is elaborating on the Polish democratization

were hopes among the union's representatives that these limited freedoms would end up becoming greater freedoms, triggering a process of change. During the negotiations the government offered "elections" to Solidarność, which would have resulted in a pre-defined division of seats in parliament between the government and Solidarność, reserving 65 per cent of seats for the government and 35 per cent for the union. However, the Solidarność negotiators did not request the 35 per cent for themselves but demanded that these 35 per cent of seats should be offered to anyone. This meant that at least for these 35 per cent of seats semi-free elections should take place. In June 1990 these elections took place and all worries by Solidarność were allayed as it won all of the 35 per cent of seats. It demanded political power and by the end of August a Solidarność-led coalition government was formed. In December 1990 Lech Wałęsa became elected president of Poland. These elections resulted in an overall change in the political atmosphere and with Glasnost and Perestroika happening in the USSR at the same time, the end of communism in Poland was sealed.

After this historical review of the emergence of Solidarność and its contribution to political transition in Poland, Dr. Onyszkiewicz identified general problems that have to be tackled whenever and wherever political transformation takes place. One great problem and challenge in Poland was the integration of old elites. This challenge is also of current interest for the situation in Egypt and Tunisia. According to Onyszkiewicz it was essential during the phase of transition that they were integrated and that only those who had really broken the law were prosecuted. Another major problem was the creation of an independent judiciary. Mr Onyszkiewicz emphasized that an independent judiciary was of great importance as it was alien to the communist system. He described that they did not know how the judges would behave in the new system and there were great problems at the beginning as the independence and impartiality of the judiciary was not ensured in the first transitional years. Also the role of the army and how to deal with it was among one of the central problems. As the army resembles a very undemocratic structure within a democracy and the army has factual power, the installation and guaranteeing of democratic, civilian control is of high importance. On the whole, Mr Onyszkiewicz concluded that Poland has successfully dealt with these problems and challenges. He argued that the most important condition for a successful contribution to Poland's political transition was the imperative that the movement stays united despite attempts by the ruling authorities to create frictions among them. The main reason for its united standing can be found in its character as a trade union and the common goal of fighting for democracy. It was not until later in the transitional phase that the existing streams within the movement diversified and different parties and organizations were founded.

Summarizing Solidarność's role Dr. Onyszkiewicz emphasized that it was essential that it deprived communism of its legitimacy and that it managed to develop such a great size and influence that the authorities had to accept that martial law would not put an end to their activities and to the political demands of the people. Finally, it was also central that Solidarność sensed that the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine would not be valid anymore under Mikhail Gorbachev and that he would not resort to violent means. Thus in Onyszkiewicz pictorial language, Solidarność was the actor which had to "draw the tail of the lion," to test whether it was really dead and thus to prove that Soviet forces would really not intervene anymore in their satellite states. Being asked by one participant where he sees the main differences between Poland and Tunisia or Egypt Onyszkiewicz pointed out that in contrast to Poland the latter ones already had market economies. Most importantly, the political forces in these countries do not stand united. In Egypt for example 40 parties have been created so far, which Onyszkiewicz termed a "recipe for disaster." Therefore, Dr. Onyszkiewicz recommended to the participants and political forces in the two countries to keep together and to form political blocks. Otherwise, he warned, they would lose the upcoming elections. He added that they should offer some political space for certain old guards of the regime and that young Egyptians and Tunisians should be very careful with the army. Discussing once more the role of the army in transition, Dr. Onyszkiewicz explained that the Polish army is highly respected and that it accepted a passive role as well as civilian control. This could be mainly attributed to the fact that the army had always been under communist control and that parts of the army also had some "sense of guilt," as they had quashed several revolts under communist rule. Discussing the role of external actors like the European Union (EU), Dr. Onyszkiewicz argued that the EU played a certain role in political transition, but only at a very late stage of the process, by setting the incentive of EU membership. The support of civil society through the EU has been and should be important—also in Egypt and Tunisia.

PD Dr. Andreas Ufen: "Transition in Indonesia—A Crisis of Democratic Governance"

Setting out for new horizons and trying to bridge the experiences in other world regions with the ones in the MENA region PD Dr. Andreas Ufen, Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg, Germany, provided the participants with insights into the transition process in Indonesia. According to him the case of Indonesia can be defined as successful and as one which has not undergone a major crisis of democratic governance.

After imbedding Indonesia in the Southeast-Asian region and drawing regional comparisons, Mr Ufen gave a short overview of Indonesia's history, mainly concentrating on the Suharto Era between 1965 and 1998. Suharto came to power through a coup in 1965 and established a very authoritarian neo-patrimonial system based on a strong military. There were elections but they were neither free nor fair as "Golkar," the ruling party, always gained 60 per cent of seats and Suharto acted as "final arbiter" in all decisions. Political Islam was subdued, however from 1980 onwards a state-controlled islamization took place. Indonesia was very western-oriented and characterized by a strong export-oriented modernization. Its middle class and civil society were weak and Indonesia's major companies were controlled by the military, relatives of generals or by Chinese cronies. However, in the late 1980s and 1990s a growing liberalization mainly in form of a transformation of the economy began. This transformation was embossed by increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), the emergence of a new middle class, and increased pressure for reform and deregulation through International Financial Institutions (IFIs). More and more NGOs were established, which also started a discourse on human rights and democratization. Additionally, while parties and trade unions were officially illegal, they became to a certain extent tolerated by the state. Very essential for the transition was factionalism within the army as great parts were discontent with Suharto and his family.

Drawing links to the case of Egypt, Mr Ufen mentioned several similarities between the two countries: the authoritarian system with a strong military, a controlled bureaucracy, one ruling party, manipulated and hardly competitive elections, and a neo-patrimonial leader. Also the forms of repression have been similar, as well as the regimes' western-oriented modernization. Both countries witnessed similar forms of repression and Islamist underground movements, as well as mostly secular, heterogeneous opposition movements. While in Indonesia the transformation was mainly triggered by financial crisis, Mr Ufen could not see a clear trigger in the case of Egypt. Finally the military did not intervene, but pushed a neo-patrimonial leader to resign. Coming back to the case of Indonesia, Mr Ufen described that in May 1998 the discontent parts of the military, as well as members of Suharto's party "Golkar" and external actors pressured Suharto to step down from power. Thus, the transition in Indonesia was not one from below but rather an arranged and protracted transition. It resulted in grand coalitions and a form of "patrimonial democracy." The newly elected president Bucharuddin Habibie was forced to initiate reforms: new parties and independent trade unions were established, basic political rights were guaranteed and a referendum in East Timor was held. According to Mr Ufen, the transition in Indonesia can be divided into three phases: the first encompasses the months around the first elections and

shows a development towards a rather fragile electoral democracy. The second phase between 1999 and 2004 includes the second elections and is characterized by a development towards a consolidated electoral democracy. Finally, the third phase from 2004 until today can be described as one of a consolidation of democracy towards a liberal democracy.

Giving an outlook on the present and future of Indonesia's democracy Mr Ufen named a great number of achievements: Indonesia today can be characterized as a stable presidential democracy with a multi-party system. Free and fair elections have taken place three times during the last years and there are major improvements regarding civil rights and political liberties. The Indonesian armed forces are today under civilian control and a decentralization has taken place since 2001, which has been of great importance in a multiethnic community like Indonesia. Related to this characteristic, a resolution of conflicts beyond Java has been obtained; there are no serious forms of secession or civil war. After the great economic crisis the economy has developed and stabilized. Finally, the general support for democracy among the population is high. Thus, overall, the transition has been very successful. Nevertheless, some failures and insufficiencies have to be named: past crimes have not been investigated thoroughly enough. In West Timor and Irian Jayah (Western Papua) human rights violations are still taking place. There is widespread corruption, a cartel of political parties and collusion among political elites. Despite some economic growth, gross social inequalities continue



PD Dr. Andreas Ufen leads into the Extreme Orient

to exist. The country also experiences a renaissance of anti-liberal Islamism (e.g. a new pornography law) as well as violence against religious and ethnic minorities.

PD Dr. Ufen concluded his lecture by describing Indonesia as a case where transition has been arranged and protracted and as one which shows the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Indonesia could also serve as an example illustrating that the relationship between economic development and democratization is far more complex than traditional modernization theory assumes. Finally, even though democratization has also led to new conflicts in the country, democracy has also made it possible to solve them. In the Q&A-Session the role of the old elites was discussed. Mr Ufen explained that these elites were part of the transition process and that they are still part of the regime today. Hence there is still a widespread “culture of impunity,” the military is still very strong, and the old bureaucracy is influential. Mr Ufen was also asked for the reasons for the current shortcomings and failures in the country: he elaborated that the rather low economic development could be attributed to the wide-spread corruption endemic in the Indonesian system. There are no trade unions. Finally, a very central problem identified is the wide gap between the political class and civil society and PD Dr. Ufen emphasized once more how important factionalism within the military had been in Indonesia and that civilian control over the military has been established, even though the military is still a very strong actor today.

Almut Möller: “The EU Neighbourhood Policy—Critical Review and the Way Forward”

Almut Möller, Head of DGAP’s Alfred von Oppenheim-Center for European Policy Studies, very critically assessed in her lecture the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in its Southern dimension. She emphasized that Europe’s answer to the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe was enlargement and posed the question about the adequate and necessary reaction of the EU to recent developments in North Africa. Ms Möller argued that enlargement was a successful strategy to support Central and Eastern European states in their democratic transitions, but that with the enlargement fatigue, the financial crisis, and other factors it cannot be the solution for North Africa. Still a comprehensive approach and solid strategy are necessary. But since the EU continues to define its interests regardless of people’s needs in its Southern neighborhood, the development of a common strategy deviating from past policies seems in her eyes very challenging and difficult to realize.

Ms Möller argued that the EU is geographically tied to very different neighbors, rendering the establishment of relations and cooperation a difficult task that

requires diversity, flexibility, and a solid knowledge base about societies in the respective countries. The ENP was a very ambitious project inspired by the freedom and liberation movements after 1989. The concept as such was a huge step into the right direction and in the case of Central and Eastern Europe proved effective. But the situation differs clearly in the Southern Mediterranean. The main deficiencies lie in the implementation. In general, one has to admit that the ENP towards the Southern neighborhood was not very successful and positive effects are hard to find. She pointed out that the ENP is still essential for the survival and success of the EU but that a thorough review was necessary and is still taking place. Realizing that it has to change its course with the changes in the Arab world, the EU drew up three documents that appeared after the uprisings in the Arab world. One appeared in March 2011 in which the ENP is reaffirmed whilst admitting that there were deficits in implementation and that there is a need for offering more incentives to Arab countries for carrying out genuine democratic reforms. The second one appeared on 25 May and the third on 30 May.

Despite these efforts, Ms Möller still sees several weaknesses with the ENP. No clear thresholds for human rights performance in the respective countries were defined. The more-for-more principle, i. e. granting countries that perform well in the realization of political reforms more support and privileges, has flaws as double standards are already the norm (i. e. Saudi Arabia) and a negative conditionality was not specified. Besides, the three documents are not binding. Trade and



Schams (Egypt) is posing a question to Ms Möller

migration, two of the most fiercely demanded openings by the North African side that would positively affect the income and perspectives of millions of citizens, have no specific breaking-through provision. One of the main additional weaknesses she observes is the almost exclusive focus on governments as negotiation partners. The ENP envisages a highly institutionalized, formal, and technocratic approach, which hardly leaves any space for the inclusion of civil society actors. The same applies to the Union of the Mediterranean, which is rather an inter-state union. Ms Möller stressed that civil society inclusion is essential for the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of relations and joint endeavors and that therefore cooperation should not only be left to politicians. Especially regarding social and economic projects and programs, in the past major stakeholders such as trade unions, NGOs, independent technocrats and researchers were excluded from the negotiation process with the EU, a fatal mistake that she believed needs to be eliminated. The contradiction between security and stability interests on the one hand and a value driven policy such as democratic reform and the promotion of human rights on the other hand was another major weakness identified to which Ms Möller had no ready-made solution, saying that values are subordinated to economic and strategic interests especially in a globalized world witnessing fierce economic competition and a scramble for natural resources, and that security and stability concerns will continue to dominate. This dilemma will haunt the EU's policies towards other countries and regions, but Möller pledged for the EU to be more vocal about these priorities, decrease hypocritical statements, and be less ambitious and more realistic with documents and declarations.

She equally lamented that the ENP reform debate and other policy debates related to North Africa are currently drifting towards a classical security debate that very likely will again produce deficient outcomes. Additionally, instead of continuing its bilateral approach, the EU should include other significant regional actors such as Turkey and the GCC countries in its endeavors and policy formulation targeting the region, taking into consideration that the ENP is but one small instrument that could be complementary to other initiatives on different levels and that needs to be neatly coordinated with these very initiatives. Ms Möller was also skeptical about the suggestion to create the European Endowment for Democracy, a facility that should promote civil society and assist in the democratization process. Substance questions were not adequately answered, and how this new instrument will be structured, managed, and coordinated with other existing facilities working in the same domain was left unclear. Hence, the way forward is very difficult for her to predict. The EU is closely watching developments in its neighborhood and it has to be prepared for new insecurities resulting from changing dynamics in the region. Syria, Libya, and Palestine, and a change of political actors in North Africa

are but a few examples. For Ms Möller the EU has to carry out a soul searching process and decide whether it sincerely wants to reach to its Southern neighbors, increase its eye-to-eye cooperation with these countries, and eliminate deficiencies in its knowledge base about Arab societies. The initial goal of the ENP to mainly establish a platform for communication could not be more relevant today, especially with the current turbulences in North Africa and the reshuffling of coordinates. More knowledge and understanding need to be nurtured on the side of the EU, as the region will certainly become more diverse and heterogeneous. She stated that in former times the Mediterranean rather connected both regions, while today it is widely perceived as a border that separates countries and people, and policies follow this logic. Hence the main question for her is whether the EU has a genuine interest and willingness to build bridges across this natural “border.”

Henriette Sachse and Laura Fueser: “Germany’s Development Cooperation with North Africa—Lessons Learnt and New Approaches”

To introduce Germany’s approaches and strategies for development cooperation in general and with North Africa in particular—and to discuss possible lessons learnt from the most recent developments with the students, two employees of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) visited the Summer School: Laura Fuesers, who is working in the ministry’s Policy Planning Staff, and Henriette Sachse, who is Desk Officer for Syria, Jordan, Iraq at the Near and Middle East Division.



Henriette Sachse and Laura Fueser gave an overview over Germany’s development cooperation

Ms Sachse explained that development cooperation with MENA countries is always related to one of four topics: water, energy (esp. renewable energy), education, and/or economic cooperation. Those focal points are guiding Germany's development cooperation in the MENA region. In general the BMZ is cooperating with nine partner countries in the region: Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen. Because of the recent developments and the current insecure situation, the BMZ has temporarily stopped any cooperation with Syria and Yemen. The type of cooperation with specific countries highly depends on the needs of the respective partner. For instance, the cooperation with Jordan is mainly focused on the water sector. In every project, the BMZ attaches great importance to the inclusion of participatory elements, since the BMZ regards civil society in the partner countries as essential for the success of any cooperation. One of the main instruments for the cooperation with MENA countries is funding of developmental projects. The BMZ currently provides three main funds: 1) the BMZ has invited political foundations to focus on the transformation processes in Tunisia and Egypt, and is providing funds for respective initiatives; 2) another fund (eight million Euros) is provided for employment initiatives, especially in the youth sector; and 3) the third fund (20 million Euros) is mainly for micro-financing and will be distributed to different banks in the region, which will then provide loans for small enterprises.

Laure Fuesers raised the question why Germany should actually be active in development cooperation in the MENA region at all. She explained that there are two main political reasons: 1) the MENA region is Europe's immediate neighborhood and hence, it is in Europe's own interest that the region is stable; 2) because of Germany's history, the Middle-East conflict is a very sensitive topic in Germany and hence, the region is of special interest. Those two reasons go hand in hand with Germany's general commitment to liberal, democratic values, which necessitates the support for the current transformation and the improving of living conditions. The representatives explained that the BMZ is mainly working bilaterally, but also through the EU level, especially in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Moreover, the G8-process is essential for the ministry's work. At the same time, Ms Fuesers emphasized that development cooperation is not only a matter of governments but that the business sector and civil society should be involved in the process. According to her, this approach has become more important under the current minister. Unlike other states, who only deal with governments in their development cooperation, the BMZ has also the possibility to communicate with civil society by supporting political foundations who are active in the region.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı: “Potentials and Limits of Turkey as a Partner in the Arab Region”

The group experienced a very heated and interesting debate during Professor Bağcı's session, Professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. He kicked off the presentation by explaining that he has been accompanying the summer school for more than a decade and that the change in topics of the school went hand in hand with changes on the international scene, starting with a focus on the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the 1990's, moving to the war on terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of 9/11 and related security challenges, and now depicting the historic transformations in the Arab region and the unprecedented uprisings that spilled over from one country to another.

Mr Bağcı emphasized that in the recent past Turkey has been receiving major and increasing attention regionally and worldwide and that this trend will continue, the reason being a major shift in the country's standing and development. In the 1990's Turkey was considered a human rights violator that sentences the death penalty, suppresses the Kurds, severely limits freedoms etc. Then in 1999 it became a candidate for the EU accession and in 2005 the negotiation process started. By then it was not considered a deficit democracy any longer. Bağcı stressed that Turkey learned extensively from the negotiation process and that today it is a Muslim country with a Western democratic system, hence a model for the Islamic



Prof. Bağcı during his lecture on Turkey's role in the Middle East

world. The political boost was accompanied by a massive modernization program and economic growth that helped stabilize the political gains. Turkey is now a member in the G20, occupies the 16th place in the world's strongest economies, and by 2030 is predicted to reach place 11 while Germany will be on place 5. All these rapid developments dramatically increased the country's influence, a development far beyond the expectations or anticipations of its people and government. As a consequence of its attractiveness, Arab money is flowing in, Arab tourism is on the rise, and the country became a hub for Arab intellectuals and writers. He also highlighted the multiculturalism present in Turkey and added that Turkey together with Iran and Egypt are regionally the most multicultural societies in terms of politics, culture, and religion. A question that quickly surfaced was if Turkey will eventually turn its back towards Europe and endorse the Islamic world. Bağcı doubted that this will occur, but he stressed that Turkey is not obliged to listen to Brussels and that the country is relatively independent. He argued that Turkey wants to become a global player without leaving Western institutions because it extracts its strength from these very ones. It therefore seeks a balance between the West and the Middle East region, and due to Turkey's economic and political power it shoulders an increased responsibility. In his opinion Turkey will not become an Islamic state because of a historical determination since 1856 where Turkey became a European state in the sense of state formation. Bağcı held the view that, among others, because of the European dimension in Turkey's political system and society it is attractive for the Arab region, and in general, its political, economic, and cultural reality moved it to the center of regional and international politics and attraction.

He stated that recent developments in the Middle East are interesting and clearly affecting Turkey as well. Along the country's borders are numerous countries and it is located in the vicinity of 16 major conflict areas. With the escalation of violence in Syria, people are fleeing to Turkey. But for him, there is no such thing as a bad versus a good revolution. Despite the destabilizing effect the uprisings are inflicting on the region, he sees the changes that are occurring exactly 100 years after the fall of the Ottoman Empire followed by colonialism and the independence movements as unique and he believes that they will create a new order in the Middle East with a new generation and new perspectives that might lead to a more peaceful region. During the Cold War the Arab world was dominated by Gamal Abdel Nasser's voice, propagating pan-Arabism and designing policies accordingly. Today, he pointed out, there is not a single Arab leader clearly endorsing the region. Because of this political vacuum, Turkey stepped in, which is a normal phenomenon in international politics. He stressed that Turkey has never been as strong economically, politically, and culturally as it is today and that it is a soft pow-

er in the Middle East. Concerning perceptions of Turkey on the Arab side, Bağcı observed that Arab intellectuals have mixed feelings towards the country: some aggrandize the Turkish model while others are very cautious and skeptical. But he believed that Turkey being for example the only country in the region speaking up against Israel lends it popularity especially among the masses on the streets. He pledged for Turkey to heavily invest in the youth in the Middle East on an intellectual level and to intensify the trend of Arab tourism. As Turkey is the strongest economic power in the region and is a major exporter, it offers very lucrative business opportunities that Arab countries should seize and he stressed that economic interdependence is already a reality.

Although the country is culturally and economically very advanced, Bağcı lamented several political deficiencies. One political party had been dominant in the past ten years and it endorses ideologically Islamic positions. Only three ministers are not followers of this line of thought. The Turkish foreign minister's zero-problem policy with neighboring countries proved to be only good on paper and to ease historical bills and nurture the spirit of the time, namely that of cooperation rather than confrontation. But within one year from announcing this policy, Libya and Syria turned into serious problematic neighbors and the Arab spring has forced Turkey to thoroughly rethink its policies and politics. Bağcı explained that the foreign minister sees the Arab spring as advantageous for Turkey and conducive to its foreign policy. He formulated five principles that now should guide Turkish policies towards the region, the major ones being: 1. security for all countries in the region; 2. democracy for all and promotion of its backbone, which is a stable and big middle class; 3. political dialogue with all actors including non-state actors. In Turkey there is a mushrooming of organizations, which is a sign for democracy, and Ankara has become the epicenter for Arab NGOs to debate and dialogue. This, according to Bağcı, should be further intensified and expanded. At the end he urged the new political actors to select a leader, a father figure, which guides the countries through these transformations, as without leadership he thinks the process is doomed to fail.

In the Q&A-session, critique was inter alia expressed concerning the reality of Israeli-Turkish relations and that rather artificial internal politics lead to an Israel bashing that is not in line with the reality of their real bi-lateral relations. There were also many critical voices concerning the country's model function, especially in light of grave political deficits such as the curtailment of the right of veiled women, minorities' rights, and the right to freedom of expression and thought. And participants believed that Turkey is fearful of competition from Egypt and that this is the driving force behind its regional outreach. Finally, they saw the

main problem of many Arab countries in their patrimonial system with a head that is detached from people's aspirations and needs and therefore completely rejected a father figure. They insisted on the need for a leadership (maybe a league of wise women and men) sharing people's values and aspirations and criticized prioritizing securitization instead of democratic reforms in Turkey's foreign policy towards North Africa.

Dr. Muriel Asseburg: "Developments in Syria—Implications Nationally, Regionally and, Internationally"

Dr. Muriel Asseburg presented in her lecture different scenarios for developments in the escalating conflict in Syria. She termed it a slow-motion revolution, a term used by the International Crisis Group, because the uprising took a long time until it reached Damascus and other bigger cities. Her analysis showcased that the Syrian case differs in two aspects from other uprisings in the region, especially those in Egypt and Tunisia. The first aspect is the fact that in Syria the uprisings were ignited and carried out by local marginalized groups of different ages, not mainly middle-class youth as in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The second aspect is related to the role of the military that from the beginning brutally cracked down on the protestors. She identified the main grievances to be the exacerbating socio-economic conditions in the country. The economic opening only favored an elite and left the majority of the population with higher living costs while no adequate social policies and reforms were undertaken parallel to the economic liberalization and modernization program. Severe droughts have resulted in migration of a large number of Syrians from the Eastern provinces towards the West, thereby increasing the economic and social burden of the other provinces. The second grievance is political in nature, namely the absence of political reforms and the perpetuation of one of the most repressive regimes in the region and even worldwide.

Asseburg explained that in the past and despite its repressiveness, the regime still enjoyed popularity on the national and regional level but that Assad failed to detect the waning of his and the system's popularity within the population. Nevertheless, the number of protestors was still relatively low, and she believed that Syrians are hesitant to engage out of fear of a civil war. The society is already branded by the civil war in Iraq and the large number of refugees who fled to Syria, but she also stressed that there is still sympathy with the regime within large parts of society and that minorities are relatively well treated and people appreciate the relative stability characteristic of the country. Another factor that clearly hampered the uprising was the immense brutality used from the very beginning by the regime, but she predicted that in the long run this brutality will rather increase the number of protestors. According to Asseburg, the regime reacted by alleged

concessions and by introducing subsidies and reshuffling the government. At the same time the regime blamed Islamists to be behind the uprisings, termed the demands of the protestors as illegitimate, and continued its severe repression of the peaceful protests, rendering the concessions negligent. The opposition tired to organize on a national and international level and across ethnic and religious lines but Asseburg noted that there was a split between the traditional opposition (the Damascus Spring group of 2000/2001) and new opposition forces, the former demanding dialogue rather than a continuation of the protests. Besides, no consensus could be reached on the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey hosted several meetings of the opposition and the National Council for Salvation that was established and included groups of the opposition except for the Kurds, the reasoning being their demand to remove the term “Arabic” from the name of the country.

Asseburg predicted a steady escalation of the conflict that would spread all over the country and emphasized that the status quo can never be upheld and the Assad regime stabilized. But she only saw a glimpse of hope for the protesters and the chance of toppling the regime by defections from within the regime and high-ranking officers in the army. She pointed out that an alarming phenomena is the rising sectarian tension that could lead to more violence but also a full-fledged civil war with major regional repercussions and a probable Turkish military intervention. Asseburg ruled out a negotiated regime change as too much blood has



Dr. Muriel Asseburg during her talk on Syria

already been spilled and the opposition was unlikely to accept this. As to the reaction of the international community, Asseburg gave a sobering assessment, pointing out that Western states are very cautious with the Assad regime because of regional implications and that therefore they only slowly stepped up pressure on the regime. The US for example is expecting the opposition to find a solution through negotiations. Asseburg criticized that the Security Council only condemned the bloodshed after attacks were carried out on foreign embassies and not as a reaction to the killing of 1600 people. Regional actors such as Hamas have distanced themselves from the regime, creating tensions on the axis Syria-Hizbollah-Hamas-Iran. Israel is ambivalent, as with Assad it had a relatively calm border and with the rise of new actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, this situation could change.

At the end Asseburg insisted that a military intervention would only aggravate the conflict and that instead, the international community should increase its political and economic pressure while supporting the opposition technically.

Social Activities and Visits to German Institutions

The 15th International Summer School's program included a number of social activities and events as well as visits to various institutions and organizations in Berlin. By organizing social activities, the Summer School aims at building a strong bond between the participants, making it a unique and sustainable cross-cultural experience. By visiting different political institutions such as the Ministry of Defence, the participants have the chance to interact with political actors and learn more about German policies and strategies. By visiting other organizations such as an electoral research institute different important elements of a full-fledged democracy became visible.

Scavenger Hunt

On the first day of the program, following the official opening and the first lecture, the participants embarked on a scavenger hunt through Berlin. In four teams they made their way through four different neighborhoods and explored the city's history, culture, and its people. Afterwards, the evening was rounded off with a dinner on DGAP's terrace where the participants had the chance to share their experiences and to get to know each other in a relaxed atmosphere..



One group is posing with the famous East-German car "Trabant" during the Scavenger Hunt

Visit to the Office of the Federal Commissioner for preserving the records of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU)—Joachim Förster: “Dealing with the State Security of Despotic Regimes—Germany’s Experience with the Stasi and Lessons Learnt for Egypt and Tunisia”

What importance do the “Stasi Archives” hold with regards to coming to terms with the recent German past and to what extent can these experiences be related to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt? Trying to find answers to these questions, the ISS’s participants visited the archives of the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service (BStU) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the third day of the International Summer School. Participants gained insights into the methods and procedures of the GDR Ministry for State Security (MfS), popularly known as the Stasi. The former Stasi was a vast organization that the East German regime used to suppress citizens who were opposed to its ideologies. While in operation, the Stasi accumulated millions of data and photo material of East German citizens. The participants were astonished and at the same time dismayed about the huge amount of files and index cards, which can today be found in the archives. On a tour through the building the participants found out that about 111,000 meters of files have been archived so far. Encountering some bags with shredded files, the archivists explained that when East Germany collapsed in 1989 the Stasi officers tried to destroy evidence of their activities through mass destruction of the files. Fortunately, demonstrators managed to occupy many branches of the Stasi-offices, to stop the destruction, and to save most of the files. However, there are still about 15,000 bags of shredded files in total while only around 440 of these bags have been reconstructed so far, amounting to about a million Stasi files. Illustrating the great importance of offering people the possibility to deal with their past and to find out who denounced them to the Stasi, the participants were told that the office received over six million applications for file inspections between 1991 and 2011 by victims, journalists and government officials.

After the tour, Joachim Förster, Head of the Department AU (Auskunft/Verwendung von Unterlagen) of the BStU, gave a short lecture about the foundation and structure of the BStU. He stated that it was not easy for Germans to decide how to deal best with what happened under the communist regime in the GDR. There was unease among the population about whether or not to release information gathered by the Stasi to the public. Today, a government law allows the public access to these strictly regulated files. The BStU’s experience of how to deal with files is seen as a good example by governments of countries that also have to find a way to come to terms with dark chapters of their history. He told the participants that the BStU is not only cooperating with many institutions in Eastern

Europe, but that it has also just recently established ties with Egypt to discuss the question of how to deal with the legacy left by the country's secret police.

Visit to the Federal Ministry of Defence—Major General Karl Müllner: “The Role of the Military in a Democratic System and Ongoing Operations of the German Armed Forces”

To get a better understanding of Germany's security and defense approach as well as the role that the military plays in the German democratic system, the Summer School was invited to the Federal Ministry of Defence, situated in the famous Bendler Block. At the ministry, Major General Karl Müllner received the visitors, introduced the foundations of German defense policy, and discussed several related topics with the students.

Major General Müllner highlighted the role of history for understanding German defense policies. After World War II the German armed forces were completely demolished and until 1949 even no German state did exist. In the years after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD), there were controversial discussions on whether the new state should also be allowed to re-arm. Among the occupying powers but also within German society the resistance against such plans was evident. In 1955, the German Bundeswehr was finally established. From the very beginning, the Bundeswehr was highly integrated in international organizations, first and foremost NATO, but also the UN and later on the EU. This exclusively multilateral orientation still shapes German defense policy today. When the Bundeswehr was founded, the underlying idea was that the army should not be able to gain a politically and socially dominant role as during the German Empire or be isolated from society like during the Third Reich and become a state within the state. Therefore, the head of the military is the Defence Minister, a civilian who is part of the government, which exemplifies the primacy of politics. At the same time, the parliament has several important instruments of control. Hence, the German Bundeswehr is a parliamentary army. First and foremost, the parliament has to approve every deployment of the military abroad. Moreover, the parliament does decide about the budget of the Bundeswehr.

In total, about 7000 German soldiers are currently deployed in ten out-of-area operations, most of them in Afghanistan (around 4100). All of these operations are undertaken under the umbrella of either NATO, the UN or the EU. Major General Müllner also touched upon the “comprehensive approach”—an approach that is advocated by the German government in the context of military operations and that attempts to integrate various policy areas essential to the needs of the host country's population. In the following Q&A-session the participants where mainly

interested in Germany's position regarding the intervention in Libya, the delivery of tanks to Saudi-Arabia and the role of Germany in security issues in the MENA region in general. In a heated debate, it became obvious that Germany is in a very special position when it comes to any security issue in the Middle East because of the historic responsibility towards the state of Israel. This makes the Middle East a very sensitive topic in German foreign and security policy. The visit ended with a reception and a formal lunch where the participants had the chance to further discuss with Major General Müllner and several employees of the ministry.

Visit to Infratest dimap—Jürgen Hofrichter: “Electoral and Political Research in Democratic Systems—Role, Methods, and Instruments”

On Friday (15 July 2011) afternoon, the Summer School visited the office of Infratest dimap, a German electoral and political research institute. Jürgen Hofrichter, Director for Election Research, introduced the work of Infratest dimap and discussed with the students the role of opinion and electoral research in a democracy. He explained that electoral and political research can fulfill three functions: firstly, it has a descriptive function, which means that it offers insights about the citizens of a state. For this kind of research, the same methods as for market research are used and the customers are mainly ministries and the like. Secondly, it has also a demoscopic function. Hence, it can reveal information about public opinion and thereby create news and provide information. Since this kind of research is of high public interest, the main customers in this context are media companies. One specific characteristic feature of this kind of research is that the results can be measured against reality by posing the question: was the outcome of the election similar to the predictions? And thirdly, electoral and political research can fulfill a strategic function, which means that they can also be used for classical political consultancy.

Mr Hofrichter illustrated the institute's work by outlining the timetable for the next elections in Berlin. Before the elections, Infratest dimap will carry out six to eight pre-election surveys in which the public will be asked about their party preferences, the reasons for their choices, the popularity of single politicians etc. On election day, the first prognosis will be published by Germany's main TV stations at 6:00 pm sharp following the closing of the polling stations. The prognosis will be based on a survey in which Infratest dimap asks voters right after leaving the polling station. The research institute will also analyze the reasons for the election outcome for instance by voter flow analyzes. According to Mr Hofrichter, the most important role of opinion and electoral research in a democracy is to build a bridge between politics and the citizens. Infratest dimap is therefore surveying opinions but also ensuring transparency in the electoral process. Thereby, the most

important criteria for good research are high quality work methodologies, the employment of well trained interviewees, as well as commitment to neutrality and transparency.

The Summer School participants were highly impressed by the work of Infratest dimap and discussed the chances and obstacles for developing such an instrument in Egypt and Tunisia. In this context, Mr Hofrichter highlighted Infratest dimap's international network and the possibility of working together with institutes in other parts of the world. At the same time, it became obvious that an independent institute such as Infratest dimap does not exist in Egypt or Tunisia, and that reaching this high level of sophistication might take many more years, whilst there was a consensus that political and electoral research are necessary instruments for any truly democratic system.

Visit to the Reichstag, Seat of the German Parliament

The weekend mainly consisted of free time. Only on Sunday, a visit to the Reichstag, the seat of the German parliament, was part of the Summer School program. During the guided tour, the students were introduced to the German political system, to the history of the building as well as various modern art projects in the Reichstag. After the tour, the participants made their way up to the famous glass dome and enjoyed the magnificent view over the city.



The group on the Reichstag's terrace

Working Groups and Debates

During the Summer School, the participants convened in four working groups to each work on controversial questions related to the overall topic of the Summer School. The working groups presented their findings in the form of Oxford debates. Motivated by engaging in and eventually winning a debate, the working groups met repeatedly to prepare their argumentation and positions for the debates. They were deliberately composed of participants from diverse backgrounds and regions in order to stimulate the debate, to prevent the discussion from degenerating into stereotypes, and to provide the working groups with first-hand knowledge and insights from the respective regions.

Oxford-style debates are highly regulated in terms of time limits, speaker positions and procedure. The discussants are divided into two groups: Proposition (Yes) and Opposition (No). The participants' personal opinion is not decisive, since the discussants have to defend the position they were assigned to. In case of the Summer School, each group comprised seven or eight members. In each debate, the first group spoke in favor of the motion, the second group opposed it. The audience—which had the opportunity to pose questions and comments in a Q&A-session—consisted of the two working groups not directly involved in the debate.



During several Working Group Sessions the participants prepared the debates

The winner of each debate was ascertained by the audience: before the debate started, the audience gave its opinion regarding the question through a secret vote. After the debate, the audience once again advanced its opinion on the given question or motion. The audience was asked for an objective assessment of the teams' performance. For each person from the audience that has been convinced—that means for every change in opinion—the respective team received two points. For each assessment in favour of the group one point was given.

On the first debating day, two motions have been addressed, “Neoliberalism fails to achieve social justice” and “Party officials of former autocratic regimes should be barred from political life altogether.” On the second debating day, the four newly composed working groups competed in a small tournament. In the “semi-finals,” group 1 and 2 debated about the question “Should the military in post-authoritarian settings have constitutional authority to safeguard the values and principles of the state?,” group 3 and 4 about “Should the EU recognize the legitimate election of political forces who do not subscribe to liberal, secular values?” The winner of debate 1 then debated against the winner of debate 2 about the motion “Only a secular state can be a democratic state.”



Pepijn from the Netherlands is bringing forward his arguments

Impressum

© Dezember 2012

EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V.

Rauchstraße 17/18

10787 Berlin

Deutschland

Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-30/-29

Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16

eumef@dgap.org

www.dgap.org

Fotos:

Christian AchRAINER

Satz und Umbruch:

TilMANN Chladek

